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This paper  analyzes  whether  marginal  taxation  of labor  and  capital  income  are  useful  sec-
ond best  instruments  for internalizing  the  externalities  caused  by  conspicuous  housing
consumption,  when  the  government  is  unable  to  implement  a ﬁrst best corrective  tax  on
housing wealth.  The  rationale  for  studying  income  taxation  in this  particular  context  is that
ﬁrst best  taxes  on  housing  wealth  may  be infeasible  (at least in  a shorter  time  perspec-
tive),  while  income  taxes  indirectly  affect  both  the  level  and  composition  of  accumulated
wealth.  We  show  that  a suboptimally  low  tax on  housing  wealth  provides  an incentive  for
the government  to  subsidize  ﬁnancial  saving  and  tax  labor  income  at  the  margin.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
This paper examines whether marginal labor and capital income taxation/subsidization might be useful means of exter-
ality correction when consumers have positional preferences for a durable good, in which case the individual’s consumption
f this good imposes externalities on other people. Housing constitutes an obvious example by giving the owner a direct
onsumption beneﬁt and at the same time being an asset through which to fund future consumption. Although our analysis
s applicable to any durable good having these properties, we  will refer to it as housing in what follows. This will be further
xplained and motivated below.
There is a growing body of evidence showing that people are concerned with their relative consumption. A typical ﬁnding
n this literature is that individual well-being increases if the individual’s own consumption or income increases relative to the
onsumption or income of referent others (e.g., Easterlin, 2001; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Blanchﬂower and Oswald,
004; Luttmer, 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010).1 If concerns for relative consumption are
 The authors would like to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, David Granlund, and Magnus Wikström for helpful comments and
uggestions. Research grants from the Swedish Research Council (ref 421-2010-1420) and from the Wallander-Hedelius Research Foundation (W2010-
368:1) are also gratefully acknowledged.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 90 786 50 17.
E-mail addresses: thomas.aronsson@umu.se (T. Aronsson), andrea.mannberg@umu.se (A. Mannberg).
1 Academic work on conspicuous consumption dates back at least to Veblen (1899), although the associated policy implications were brieﬂy touched
pon  already by Mill (1848). An economic theory of relative consumption was  ﬁrst presented in Duesenberry (1949).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.011
167-2681/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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driven by the desire to signal status or wealth, one would expect that clearly visible goods are more positional than less visible
goods, i.e., that the utility of consuming visible goods to a larger extent is driven by preferences for relative consumption.
Evidence from survey–experimental studies suggests that this is also the case, since visible goods such as houses and cars
have been found to be more positional than other, less visible goods (Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005;
Carlsson et al., 2007). Calculations presented in Alpizar et al. (2005) show that the degree of positionality (the extent to
which relative consumption matters compared to absolute consumption) for housing is substantial: on average, about 50
per cent of the utility gain of additional expenditures on housing may  be due to increased relative consumption.2 Therefore,
individuals’ choices of housing seem to impose substantial externalities on other people.
If housing, at least in part, represents conspicuous consumption, a ﬁrst best policy would be to tax housing wealth
such that the externality that each individual imposes on other people becomes fully internalized. Yet, although taxes on
housing wealth are used in many countries, the tax rates are often quite low; at least by comparison with the magnitude of the
positional externality mentioned above. This argument will be substantiated below, where we  show that our model combined
with empirical evidence of relative consumption concerns would imply an annual tax on housing wealth of between 2 and
3 per cent of the market value under reasonable assumptions. However, in many countries (Denmark being a notable
exception) property taxes are substantially below this rate.3 In addition, taxes on owner-occupied housing are in practice
often lower than ofﬁcial tax rates imply. This is so since mortgage interest is often deductible from taxable income and since
imputed rents go untaxed. This implies that capital in terms of housing is preferentially treated in comparison to other types of
capital (e.g., Gervais, 2002). One reason for setting such low tax rates might be that property taxes are politically controversial,
and homeowners constitute an inﬂuential group in society. In Sweden, for instance, the Homeowners’ Association was  formed
partly for the purpose of collective action against taxation of housing wealth and most likely contributed to the signiﬁcant
reduction in effective tax rates during the latest decade. Also, since taxes on housing wealth (or property in general) are
often local or regional, the policy incentives implicit in such taxes may  not correctly reﬂect positional externalities; at least
not if the consumption comparisons go beyond the local or regional jurisdiction.4
Therefore, if an optimal corrective tax on housing wealth is not feasible, it is important to consider other instruments to
correct for the externalities caused by conspicuous consumption of housing. In this paper, we focus on an optimal mix of
labor and capital income taxation, which is deﬁned conditional on the existing tax on housing wealth. A key role of real estate
is to fund future consumption, suggesting that a marginal saving subsidy (negative marginal capital income tax) provides
an incentive for individuals to save more in ﬁnancial assets and spend less on housing. In turn, this policy counteracts the
positional consumption externality that housing gives rise to. One may  thus conjecture that marginal saving subsidies/taxes
are key second best instruments for internalizing externalities associated with durable goods consumption. Yet, since such
subsidies/taxes are still only indirect instruments for correction, there is room for other instruments as well, and we  consider
an optimal labor income tax alongside the savings-oriented policy described above. The idea here is that positional concerns
may lead individuals to increase their labor supply, and a marginal labor income tax policy can be designed to counteract
this incentive.5 Therefore, the mixture of labor and capital income taxes constitutes an interesting combination, since it will
affect both the level and composition of accumulated wealth.
Our study contributes to a large literature on tax and other policy responses to consumption positionality and to some
extent to the ample literature on taxation of owner-occupied housing. The latter has shown that preferential tax treatment of
owner-occupied housing causes over consumption of housing services (see, e.g., Skinner, 1996; Gervais, 2002). However, to
the best of our knowledge, this literature disregards externalities caused by positional preferences. The literature dealing with
optimal policy responses to positional externalities focuses almost exclusively on (a) positional concerns for non-durable
goods, and (b) typically also on model economies with one single private consumption good (in addition to leisure).6 In other
2 See also Zahirovic-Herbert and Chatterjee (2011), who ﬁnd that people are willing to pay more for homes with a name attached to it, and Patacchini
and  Venanzoni (2014), who ﬁnd signiﬁcant peer-effects on the demand for housing quality in USA.
3 In Sweden, for instance, the tax on housing property is 0.75 per cent of the value of the property up to a maximum limit (where the value attached to each
property by the tax authority is typically lower than the market value). The corresponding rate is between 0.2 and 0.7 per cent in Norway, where the munic-
ipalities freely decide on the implementation (about 30 per cent of the municipalities did not implement such a tax in 2009). Denmark applies a system with
two  rates: 1 per cent if the market value of the property is less than 3 million DKK and 3 per cent otherwise. The corresponding tax in Finland is 0.32–0.75 per
cent  of the market value. In Germany, the tax rate varies between 0.26 and 0.35 per cent. Great Britain also applies a zero rate except for homes with very high
market values. Property taxes in the U.S. are based on the market value and the rates vary between states (although the tax is formally collected at the local
level);  in California, the maximum rate is 1 per cent (The Swedish Homeowners’ Association, http://www.villaagarna.se/; Wikipedia, https://wikipedia.org;
Germany Trade and Invest, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Invest/Investment-guide/The-tax-system/taxation-of-property.html; International
living, http://internationalliving.com/real-estate/countries/france/taxes/; http://internationalliving.com/real-estate/countries/spain/taxes/; Properties in
Europe, http://www.properties-in-europe.com/info italy tax.htm; http://soumi.ﬁ).
4 Recent evidence suggests that social reference groups are not formed solely based on the local environment; possibly due to technological developments
of  social media and the Internet. For instance, Becchetti et al. (2010) found that the importance of social comparisons between countries has increased over
time,  and Clark and Senik (2010) found that that Internet access is positively correlated with relative consumption concerns.
5 Goerke and Hellesheim (2013) show in a theoretical model that individuals under certain conditions supply more labor if they are concerned with their
relative consumption than they would in an undistorted economy without relative concerns. Empirical evidence pointing in this direction is presented by
Bowles and Park (2005). They consider a model where individuals derive utility from their own consumption relative to the consumption of a reference
group  with higher income, and show empirically that increased inequality is associated with a larger number of work hours.
6 See, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Ng (1987), Tuomala (1990), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Dupor and Liu (2003), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman
(2008,  2010, 2014), Wendner and Goulder (2008), Knell (2010), and Bilancini and D’Antoni (2012).
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ords, most previous work does not distinguish between positional and non-positional goods, and there is surprisingly
ittle research on how tax or other policy instruments ought to respond to relative concerns for durable consumption. One
mportant exception from category (b) is Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013) dealing with optimal linear commodity taxation
n a two-good economy, where one of the goods is positional and the other non-positional. Their main contribution is to
xamine tax policy implications of non-atmospheric and asymmetric consumption externalities, and by studying the joint
ax policy implications of relative consumption concerns and inequality-aversion.7 Yet, their study neither addresses the
mplications of relative consumption of durable goods, nor the optimal mix  of labor and capital income taxation when a
exible direct instrument to target the externality is unavailable, which are the key-ingredients of the present paper. To our
nowledge, the only earlier study dealing with policy implications of relative concerns for durable goods is Aronsson and
annberg (2013). They consider an overlapping generations model where each consumer lives for three periods and analyze
he joint tax policy implications of positional concerns for housing and a self-control problem caused by quasi-hyperbolic
iscounting. Their contribution is to show how the optimal mix  of taxes on housing wealth and capital income varies over
he individual life-cycle, as well as how it depends on whether consumers have naïve or sophisticated attitudes to their
elf-control problems.
The present paper contributes to the literature in primarily two  ways. First, we analyze indirect instruments to correct
or the externalities caused by conspicuous consumption when a direct instrument is not available; a scenario of clear
ractical relevance for reasons discussed above. Our setting also means that we extend the study of optimal income taxation
n dynamic economies where the consumers have positional preferences beyond the standard framework with only one
rivate, non-durable consumption good (in which case income taxes constitute direct instruments for correction).8 As
uch, our study takes a different direction than the paper by Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013), which focuses on optimal
ommodity taxation in a model-economy with positional and non-positional goods. Second, there is not much research
n the tax policy implications of positional durable goods; the only earlier study that we are aware of is Aronsson and
annberg (2013) referred to above. We  supplement their study by considering (i) a different policy problem, (ii) another
ix  of tax instruments, and (iii) by examining a second best optimal tax policy. As such, the present paper’s focus on durable
onsumption also contributes to the literature on a more general level.
In Section 2, we present the benchmark model and brieﬂy describe how a government may  implement a ﬁrst best
ptimum through marginal taxation of housing wealth. Section 3 assumes that the possibility to tax housing wealth is
estricted and examines the optimal second best taxation of labor and capital income. The results show that if the marginal
ax on housing wealth falls short of the value of the marginal positional externality, the second best optimal policy features
 marginal saving subsidy and a marginal labor income tax. In Section 4, we  extend the analysis by considering two issues
hat the benchmark model does not address: non-separability between leisure and housing, and bequest motives. Section 5
ummarizes and concludes the paper.
. A benchmark model
The model presented here aims at capturing two aspects of housing: (1) the possibility that individuals derive utility from
heir relative consumption compared to referent others, and (2) that the individual invests in housing wealth when young
nd consumes this housing wealth along with other accumulated wealth when old. To accomplish this task in the simplest
ossible way, we abstract from the price formation process in assuming that the supply of housing units is inﬁnitely elastic
n each period, and that the individual can sell any remaining units of the house when old. As such, and by analogy to a large
iterature on optimal taxation, we assume that the production technology (in our case in both the durable and non-durable
oods sectors) is such that the producer and factor prices are ﬁxed in each period, although not necessarily constant over
ime.9The economy is represented by an overlapping generations model, in which individuals live for two periods; they work
n the ﬁrst and are retired in the second. Each individual derives utility from the consumption of two goods: a durable good
eferred to as housing and a non-durable good. Housing is assumed to be a positional good in the sense that individuals
erive utility from their relative consumption compared to referent others (in addition to the utility gain of the absolute
7 Among other things, they show that if the externality is non-atmospheric (meaning, in their study, that individuals differ in their contribution to the
xternality), the principle of targeting is no longer fully applicable such that both commodity taxes typically are used to correct for the externality caused
y  the consumption of the positional good. Eckerstorfer (2014) extends the analysis to a problem of optimal mixed taxation under asymmetric information
ased  on a static model with two  non-durable consumption goods (in addition to the labor–leisure choice), where the government decides on an optimal
onlinear income tax and a set of linear commodity taxes.
8 See Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010, 2014).
9 Our abstraction from the price formation process and from location issues does not mean that we  think these issues to be unimportant. However,
n  this paper, we  are primarily interested in analyzing tax policy to counteract positional externalities. As long as the consumers have preferences for
heir  relative consumption of housing (which is the basic assumption on which our paper rests), the policy incentives characterized below would also be
resent  in a more general framework (although possibly combined with other policy incentives depending on the functioning of the housing market). The
odel  presented below is analytically convenient and allows us to identify basic mechanisms behind a second best optimal policy designed to correct for
ositional consumption externalities.
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consumption), while the non-durable good is completely non-positional.10 Individuals also derive disutility from work effort.
To simplify the notation (since we are focusing on efﬁciency aspects of public policy), we also assume that individuals of the
same generation are identical and normalize the number of individuals per generation to one.
An individual entering the economy at the beginning of period t, to be referred to as generation t, is young (in the sense
of being active in the labor market) in period t and old in period t + 1. Let c0,t and c1,t+1 denote the consumption of the non-
durable good by the young and old generation t, respectively, lt denotes labor supply, while ht denotes housing consumption.
The lifetime utility function facing an individual of generation t is given by
Ut = U(c0,t, lt , ht, h¯t, c1,t+1) = u0(c0,t) + (lt) + (ht) + ˚(ht − h¯t) + u1(c1,t+1) (1)
Eq. (1) means that the individual derives utility both from his/her absolute consumption, ht, and relative consumption,
ht − h¯t , of housing, as well as from his/her absolute consumption of the non-durable good and use of leisure. Although the
housing choice is made during the ﬁrst period, the utility derived from housing can be interpreted as referring to both
periods of life. There are several possible ways of conceptualizing a unit of housing, and one can (at least) think of h either
as a purely quantitative measure (e.g., the number of square meters) or in terms of units of quality of housing (e.g., ﬁnishes
and ﬁxtures).11 Even if both interpretations may  be relevant from the perspective of relative concerns, which is the key issue
in our paper, we prefer the latter (quality oriented) interpretation primarily because our model lacks a spatial dimension.
The variable h¯t denotes the reference consumption in period t. We  assume that the functions u0(·), (·), ˚(·), and u1(·) are
increasing and strictly concave in their respective arguments, while (·) is decreasing and strictly concave. All goods are
normal. Also, the individual is assumed to act as an atomistic agent and treat h¯t as exogenous. The separable structure of
Eq. (1) is maintained throughout the analysis in Sections 2 and 3 and will allow us to sign key comparative statics (see Eqs.
(16a) and (16b)). However, to simplify the presentation (and avoid unnecessary notation in the formulas), the ﬁrst order
conditions will, nevertheless, be written in terms of the general function U(·).
Let yt = wtlt denote labor income, wt the wage rate, st saving, rt the interest rate, and Pt the price per unit of housing in
period t. Before imposing any restriction on the possibility to tax housing wealth, the individual’s budget constraint can be
written as follows:12
c0,t = yt − st − Ptht − 0(Ptht) − T0(yt) (2)
c1,t+1 = st(1 + rt+1) − T1(strt+1) + Pt+1ht(1 − ı) (3)
where ı denotes the rate of depreciation of a house, 0(·) is a tax on housing wealth paid when young, T0(·) a labor income
tax paid when young, and T1(·) a capital income tax paid when old. When young, the individual consumes (and invests in)
housing, consumes the non-durable good, and saves on the capital market; when old, he/she uses the ﬁnancial wealth and
housing wealth for non-durable consumption. The labor and capital income tax functions are assumed to be nonlinear such
that the government may  carry out any redistribution between generations on a lump-sum basis (if it wishes to do so). As
will be described in greater detail below, this enables us to concentrate on corrective aspects of marginal taxation.
An individual of generation t chooses housing, non-durable consumption, and work hours to maximize the utility given
by Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint in Eqs. (2) and (3), while treating wt, rt+1, Pt, Pt+1, and h¯t as exogenous. By
substituting the budget constraint into the objective function to replace the consumption of non-durable goods, we obtain
a decision-problem in st, ht, and lt with the ﬁrst order conditions13
st : −Ut,c0 + Ut,c1 [(1 + rt+1) − T ′1(s0,trt+1)rt+1] = 0 (4a)
ht : −Ut,c0 [Pt + Pt ′0(Ptht)] + Ut,h + Ut,c1Pt+1(1 − ı) = 0 (4b)
lt : Ut,c0wt(1 − T ′0(yt)) + Ut,l = 0 (4c)where Ut,c0 = ∂Ut/∂c0,t , Ut,h = ∂Ut/∂ht, Ut,c1 = ∂Ut/∂c1,t+1, and Ut,l = ∂Ut/∂lt, denote partial derivatives of the utility function,
while  ′0(Ptht), T
′
0(yt) and T
′
1(s0,trt+1) are the marginal tax rates on housing wealth, labor income, and capital income,
respectively. Note also that the old consumer makes no active decision other than selling the house: he/she then spends the
10 The assumption that the non-durable good is completely non-positional is a simpliﬁcation, yet of little practical importance as long as non-durables
are  less positional than durable goods.
11 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out different possible interpretations.
12 Since each individual only makes one housing investment in our model, and given that the individual pays a tax on housing wealth in the ﬁrst period,
a  second period tax on housing wealth (to be paid before the house is sold) would become redundant.
13 Note that the two period structure to some extent hides the possibility that individuals ﬁnance the housing purchase by borrowing on the capital
market, since ﬁnancial saving, st , must be positive to generate a capital stock to be used in production in period t + 1 (see below). However, such borrowing
is  perfectly consistent with the model set out above and just implies that st decreases. The ﬁrst period (when the individual is “young”) in our two  period
setting is interpretable to mean the individual’s whole working life up to the retirement age (around age 65–67 in Sweden). It is clearly reasonable to
expect that a representative individual has accumulated ﬁnancial wealth at the age of retirement, despite that he/she borrowed resources to ﬁnance the
housing purchase some 30 years earlier. This is what our model requires, since the working life of the individual is merged into a single period. Data from
Statistics Sweden supports this view by showing that people aged 65–74 on average have positive real wealth (in which housing wealth is included) and
positive  ﬁnancial wealth. This data is publicly available at the homepage of Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se).
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emaining wealth for consumption of the non-durable good. For purposes of comparison, in Section 4 we  consider a case
here generation t instead leaves the house as a bequest to the next generation.
.1. Optimal tax policy in the benchmark model
The government is ﬁrst mover vis-à-vis the private sector and aims at correcting the positional externalities. We  assume
 general social welfare function that is increasing in the lifetime utility faced by each generation
W = W(U0, U1, . . .).  (5)
ote that nonlinear taxation of labor income and capital income accompanied by a ﬂexible tax on housing wealth will allow
he government to perfectly control the hours of work, the consumption of durable and non-durable goods, and the capital
tock in the economy. Therefore, we follow convention in the literature on optimal nonlinear and mixed taxation in writing
he social decision-problem as a direct decision-problem in terms of work hours, private consumption, and the capital stock,
nstead of in terms of parameters of the tax functions (such as intercepts and marginal tax rates).14 The optimal marginal
ax rates can then be derived through a comparison of social and private ﬁrst order conditions. The resource constraint for
he economy as a whole in period t can be written as15
yt + kt(1 + rt) − Pt(ht − ht−1(1 − ı)) − c0,t − c1,t − kt+1 = 0 (6)
here kt is the physical capital stock deﬁned such that st−1 = kt for all t. The resource allocation preferred by the government
an be derived by choosing c0,t, lt, c1,t, ht and kt for all t to maximize the social welfare function subject to the resource
onstraint and h¯t = ht for all t. The latter follows because the individuals are identical, and the (externality correcting)
overnment recognizes how the reference consumption is determined. The Lagrangean corresponding to this decision-
roblem is given by
L = W +
∑
t
t
[
yt + kt(1 + rt) − Pt(ht − ht−1(1 − ı)) − c0,t − c1,t − kt+1
]
(7)
here t is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint in period t. Deﬁne
MRSth,c0 =
Ut,h
Ut,c0
> 0, MRStl,c0 =
Ut,l
Ut,c0
< 0, MRStc0,c1 =
Ut,c0
Ut,c1
> 0
o be the marginal rates of substitution between housing and ﬁrst period consumption; between work effort and ﬁrst period
onsumption; and between the ﬁrst and second period consumption, respectively, for an individual of generation t. The
ocial ﬁrst order conditions can then be written as follows:
MRStc0,c1 = (1 + rt+1) (8a)
MRSth,c0 +
Ut,h¯
Ut,c0
− Pt + 1
MRStc0,c1
Pt+1(1 − ı) = 0 (8b)
−MRStl,c0 = wt (8c)
Now, let t = ht − h¯t , and notice from Eq. (1) that Ut,h¯ = −∂˚(t)/∂t = −˚t,, and Ut,h = t,h + ˚t, where
t,h = ∂(ht)/∂ht. We  can then deﬁne the degree of positionality for housing in period t as the fraction of the overall utility
ain from an additional dollar spent on housing that is due to increased relative consumption, i.e.,
˛t = −
Ut,h¯
Ut,h
= ˚t,
t,h + ˚t,
∈ (0,  1).  (9)
The degree of positionality is also interpretable as the marginal externality per unit of housing consumption. As such, it
ill play a key role in the analysis of marginal tax policy below. The ﬁrst best optimal tax policy can then be summarized as
ollows based on Eqs. (4), (8) and (9):
bservation 1. The optimal tax policy in the benchmark model satisﬁes T ′0(wtlt) = 0, T ′1(s0,trt+1) = 0 and Pt ′0(Ptht) =
tMRSth,c0 for all t.
learly, since the government of the benchmark model has access to a ﬂexible tax on housing wealth, it may use this tax
o fully internalize the externality caused by conspicuous housing consumption. This explains why the marginal labor and
apital income tax rates are equal to zero: since there are no other distortions than the externality caused by each consumer’s
esire to have more units of housing than other people, and since there is no need to distort behavior just to raise revenue,
14 See, e.g., Stiglitz (1982).
15 Note that the analysis presupposes that ht ≥ ht−1(1 − ı); otherwise, old consumers would not be able to consume all their housing wealth.
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the only reason for taxing housing wealth in this model is to internalize the positional externality. Consequently, the policy
rule for this tax depends on how each individual’s housing choice affects the well-being of other people (as reﬂected in the
degree of positionality). It does not explicitly depend on other aspects of the housing market such as the change in the price
over the individual life-cycle.16
The left hand side of the tax formula for housing measures the marginal tax on housing wealth times the price paid
per unit of housing in period t, i.e., the tax payment for an additional unit of housing, which is set equal to the degree of
positionality times the marginal willingness to pay for housing in period t. Therefore, if ˛t is in the neighborhood of 0.5, as
suggested by empirical evidence presented in the introduction, about 50 per cent of the consumer’s marginal willingness to
pay for housing represents social waste and should be taxed away. To exemplify and give some substance to the argument
made in the introduction that existing taxes on housing wealth often fall short of the marginal positional externality, we
assume that Pt = Pt+1/(1 + rt+1) (in which case there is no “bubble-component” in the price), and that ı is between 2 and 4 per
cent.17 If we further assume that an individual owns a house for 30 years, our model implies that the optimal yearly tax on
housing wealth is between 1.3 and 2.7 per cent if ˛t = 0.4, and between 2 and 4 per cent if ˛t = 0.5. Except for Denmark, the
countries surveyed above (see footnote 3) apply much lower rates.
An interesting special case of our model arises when ı = 1, in which the home is no longer interpretable as a durable asset
to the individual. This special case can be interpreted such that the individuals rent their homes instead of owning them, also
meaning that the optimal tax on housing wealth ought to be re-interpreted as an ordinary commodity tax attached to the rent
payment.18 As can be seen from Observation 1, since the optimal marginal tax on housing wealth does not depend directly
on ı, and provided that the relative concerns are only associated with the quality of the home (as we assume above), the
optimal policy rule takes exactly the same form irrespective of whether individuals own or rent their homes. The intuition
is, of course, that the externality each individual imposes on other people is independent of ownership. We  show in the next
section that this qualitative result also carries over to the case where a ﬂexible tax on housing wealth (or commodity tax on
rented homes) is not available to the government; yet with a slightly modiﬁed interpretation since one of the policy rules
depends explicitly on ı in that case.
3. Suboptimal marginal taxation of housing wealth
Suppose that the government is unable to implement the optimal tax on housing wealth described in the previous
section. The tax is now given by  0(Ptht) = 	tPtht, in which 	t is a nonnegative tax rate such that 	t ≤ 	¯t , where 	¯t denotes
an upper limit. We  can interpret the upper limit as reﬂecting the resistance against taxes on housing property described
in the introduction. This formulation is also convenient as it encompasses an economy without taxation of housing wealth
(in which 	¯t = 0 for all t) and the ﬁrst best optimal tax policy characterized above (where the constraint does not bind) as
special cases. In this section, we assume that the constraint is binding, such that the tax rate on housing wealth is ﬁxed.
The question is then whether marginal taxation/subsidization of labor and capital income may  be useful as supplementary
instruments to correct for positional externalities.
To address this question, it is convenient to model the individual’s decision-problem in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we
choose ht to maximize lifetime utility in Eq. (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
b0,t = c0,t + Ptht(1 + 	t) (10a)
b1,t+1 = c1,t+1 − Pt+1ht(1 − ı) (10b)
where b0,t and b1,t+1 are treated as ﬁxed incomes in the ﬁrst and second period of life for generation t. This gives the ﬁrst
order condition
−Ut,c0Pt(1 + 	t) + Ut,h + Ut,c1Pt+1(1 − ı) = 0 (11)
which implicitly deﬁnes the individual’s demand for housing as a function of Pt(1 + 	t), Pt+1(1 − ı), b0,t, b1,t+1 and h¯t , i.e.,
ht = h
(
Pt(1 + 	t), Pt+1(1 − ı), b0,t, b1,t+1, h¯t
)
. (12)
Notice that Eq. (12) is interpretable as a conditional demand function in the sense of measuring this demand conditional on
the individual’s income and saving (which are part of b0,t and b1,t+1). By substituting Eqs. (10a), (10b) and (12) into Eq. (1),
the corresponding conditional indirect utility function can be written as
Vt = V
(
Pt(1 + 	t), Pt+1(1 − ı), b0,t, b1,t+1, lt , h¯t
)
= U
(
b0,t − Pt(1 + 	t)ht, lt , ht, h¯t, b1,t+1 + Pt+1ht(1 − ı)
)
(13)
16 Although price changes over the individual life-cycle do not lead to a change in the policy rule for the corrective tax, they may, nevertheless, affect its
level  via the demand for housing. For instance, a change in the selling price may inﬂuence the corrective tax either through the degree of positionality or
the  marginal willingness to pay for housing (or both).
17 Harding et al. (2007) estimate the gross annual rate of depreciation to 3 per cent for the typical home in the U.S. and the depreciation net of maintenance
to  2 per cent. A slightly higher opportunity cost might be motivated from commuting costs and other time-costs associated with a typical home.
18 This interpretation does not depend on the assumption that the individual only pays rent once. Even if we were to introduce a rent payment in the
second period, this commodity tax would still be designed such that the marginal externality is taxed away.
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here ht is given by Eq. (12). In the second stage, we derive the savings and labor supply behavior by choosing st and lt to
aximize the indirect utility function given by Eq. (13) subject to
b0,t = yt − st − T0(yt) (14a)
b1,t+1 = st(1 + rt+1) − T1(strt+1). (14b)
he ﬁrst order conditions for this problem can be written as
−Vt,b0 + Vt,b1 [(1 + rt+1) − T
′
1(strt+1)rt+1] = 0 (15a)
Vt,b0wt[1 − T ′0(yt)] + Vt,l = 0 (15b)
n which Vt,b0 = ∂Vt/∂b0,t , Vt,b1 = ∂Vt/∂b1,t+1 and Vt,l = ∂Vt/∂lt.
.1. Second best optimal income taxation
As explained above, the savings and labor supply choices by generation t affect the conditional demand for housing via
0,t and b1,t+1, It is, therefore, instructive to begin by deriving comparative statics of the housing demand with respect to b0,t
nd b1,t+1. Since the government aims at internalizing the positional externality and incorporates into its decision-problem
hat h¯t = ht , we differentiate Eq. (11) with respect to ht, b0,t and b1,t+1, while using h¯t = ht . This gives
dht
db0,t
= Ut,c0c0Pt(1 + 	t)


> 0 (16a)
dht
db1,t+1
= −Ut,c1c1Pt+1(1 − ı)


< 0 (16b)
here Ut,c0c0 < 0, Ut,c1c1 < 0 and

 = Ut,c0c0 [Pt(1 + 	t)]2 + Ut,hh + Ut,c1c1 [Pt+1(1 − ı)]2 + Ut,hh¯ < 0.
ouble sub-script (e.g., c0c0) denotes second order partial derivative.
With a ﬁxed tax on housing, the social decision-problem is a second best problem, which can be written as
max
b0,tb1,t ,kt ,lt∀t
W(V0, V1, . . .,  )
s.t. : yt − b0,t + kt(1 + rt) + 	tPtht − b1,t − kt+1 = 0 for all t
(17)
here the resource constraint is here expressed in terms of the “savings-adjusted” measures of disposable income given
n Eqs. (14a) and (14b). The resource constraint is derived by using 	tPtht + T0(yt) + T1(st−1rt) = 0 and st−1 = kt in combination
ith Eqs. (14a) and (14b).19 By using t to denote the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint in period t (as before),
he social ﬁrst order conditions for b0,t, b1,t+1, kt+1, and lt (the conditions characterizing an optimal allocation for generation
) become
b0,t :
∂W
∂Vt
(
Vt,b0 + Vt,h¯
dht
db0,t
)
+ t
(
−1 + 	tPt dht
db0,t
)
= 0 (18a)
b1,t+1 :
∂W
∂Vt
(
Vt,b1 + Vt,h¯
dht
db1,t+1
)
+ t	tPt dht
db1,t+1
− t+1 = 0 (18b)kt+1 : t+1(1 + rt+1) − t = 0 (18c)
lt :
∂W
∂Vt
Vt,l + twt = 0. (18d)
y using Eqs. (18a)–(18d) together with (1 + rt+1) − Vt,b0/Vt,b1 = T ′1(strt+1)rt+1 and wt + Vt,l/Vt,b0 = wtT ′0(yt) from the private
rst order conditions given in Eqs. (15a) and (15b), respectively, we can derive the following result:
19 With general, nonlinear taxes on labor and capital income, the government is able to control the hours of work, disposable income, and the capital
tock,  although it no longer has a direct instrument to control the housing choice. Instead, since 	t is ﬁxed, the government is only able to inﬂuence the
evenue from the housing wealth tax indirectly via the effects that the labor and capital income taxes have on h (through b0, and b1), which explains the
esource constraint in Eq. (17). In a way similar to the analysis in Section 2, therefore, we have still written the resource constraint in terms of the direct
ecision-variables. An alternative would be to write the resource constraint as in Eq. (6) above, which can be derived by substituting Eqs. (10a) and (10b)
nto Eq. (17), and then use that c0 and c1 are also functions of b0 and b1. The latter approach (yet modiﬁed to suit their model) was taken by Edwards et al.
1994) in their study on optimal mixed taxation. It does not matter for the results derived below which option is chosen.
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Proposition 1. If the marginal tax on housing wealth is ﬁxed at 	t for all t, the optimal marginal income tax rates will take the
form
T ′1(strt+1)rt+1 = (1 + rt+1)
[
˘t
1 + rt+1
˛tMRSth,c0 − 	tPt
](
MRStc0,c1
dht
db1,t+1
− dht
db0,t
)
wtT ′0(yt) = −MRStl,c0
[
˘t
1 + rt+1
˛tMRSth,c0 − 	tPt
]
dht
db0,t
for all t, where ˘t = (∂W/∂Vt)(Vt,b0/t+1) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In each tax formula in Proposition 1, the second term within square brackets on the right hand side is proportional to the
actual (and possibly suboptimal) tax on housing wealth, while the ﬁrst term reﬂects the value of the marginal externality.
Before we interpret the results in greater detail, note that Proposition 1 contains two useful special cases. First, if 	t = 0,
Proposition 1 and Eqs. (16a) and (16b) together imply T ′1(strt+1) < 0 and T
′
0(yt) > 0. Second, the ﬁrst best policy summarized
by Observation 1 also follows as a special case of the more general result derived in the proposition: in a ﬁrst best resource
allocation where Pt	t = ˛tMRSth,c0 and ˘ t = 1 + rt+1, we obtain T
′
1(strt+1) = T ′0(yt) = 0. These two special cases also suggest
the following more general corollary to Proposition 1 20:
Corollary 1. If Pt	t < ˛tMRSth,c0 , Proposition 1 implies T
′
1(strt+1) < 0 and T
′
0(yt) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 means that if the housing wealth tax per unit of housing falls short of the marginal externality, in which case this
tax is too low to achieve full externality correction, there is an incentive for the government to counteract the externality
further through a marginal saving subsidy and marginal labor income tax policy. The intuition is that increased saving
in ﬁnancial wealth leads to less investment in housing, i.e., ﬁnancial saving becomes a more attractive means of funding
future consumption at the individual level. As a consequence, the positional consumption externality attached to housing
decreases. Similarly, reduced labor income reduces the resources available for all types of wealth accumulation.
The multiplier MRStc0,c1 (dht/db1,t+1) − dht/db0,t < 0 in the marginal capital income tax formula in Proposition 1 appears
because the capital income subsidy constitutes an indirect instrument to reduce the housing wealth, and works through the
effect of savings on the housing demand. As such, the more an increase in savings reduces the demand for housing (through
a decrease in b0,t and corresponding increase in b1,t+1), the more effective will be the savings subsidy as an instrument to
reduce the positional externality. On the other hand, if dht/db0,t and dht/db1,t+1 are close to zero, the savings subsidy may  not
be a useful instrument to inﬂuence the accumulation of housing wealth, in which case the subsidy would be close to zero
or not used at all. The multiplier in the marginal labor income tax formula, dht/db0,t > 0, has an analogous interpretation.
Finally, let us brieﬂy return to the special case discussed in Section 2 where ı = 1, which is interpretable to mean that
individuals rent their homes instead of owning them. Note that this special case gives the same qualitative results as those
derived in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. We  should still subsidize the saving and tax the labor income at the margin under the
same general conditions to counteract the positional consumption externality. However, while the policy rule for marginal
labor income taxation would be identical to that derived in the proposition, since this formula does not depend directly on ı,
the marginal saving subsidy is likely to be smaller if individuals rent their homes because dht/db1,t+1 = 0 if ı = 1. The intuition
is that the home is no longer a durable good through which individuals may  fund future consumption and, therefore, not
an alternative to ﬁnancial wealth for the individual. In that case, the marginal saving subsidy works much like the marginal
labor income tax in the sense of just reducing the amount of resources available for consumption in the ﬁrst period. This
suggests to us that the role of marginal saving subsidies is weaker if individuals rent their homes compared to when they
own them.
4. Extensions
Results always depend on the assumptions made, and the reference model examined above is no exception. In this section,
we brieﬂy consider two relevant extensions of the analysis set out in Sections 2 and 3 by examining the implications of (i)
non-separability between housing and leisure and (ii) a bequest motive such that generation t leaves the home as a bequest
to generation t + 1. These extensions serve as a sensitivity analysis to check whether the qualitative results of the benchmark
model hold in slightly different settings.
20 If Pt	t > ˛tMRS
t
h,c0
, Proposition 1 instead implies that T ′1(st rt+1) > 0 and T
′
0(yt ) < 0. However, this would imply a scenario where the government sets
the  housing tax higher than the value of the marginal externality. This seems unrealistic since the government in this case could choose the ﬁrst best optimal
tax  instead of the second best solution. We therefore do not consider this scenario in our analysis.
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.1. Non-separability between leisure and housing
By generalizing the utility function of the benchmark model to include non-separability between leisure and housing,
q. (1) can be rewritten as
Ut = U(c0,t, lt , ht, h¯t, c1,t+1) = u0(c0,t) + (lt , ht) + ˚(ht − h¯t) + u1(c1,t+1) (19)
here the sub-utility function (·)  replaces (·) and (·) in Eq. (1); the other parts are the same as before. As such, we assume
hat (·)  is decreasing in l and increasing in h.
This change of functional form has no implication for the ﬁrst best policy rule presented in Section 2. If the degree of
ositionality is properly redeﬁned to reﬂect Eq. (19), i.e., ˛t = −Ut,h¯/Ut,h = ˚t,/( t,h + ˚t,) where t,h = ∂ (lt, ht)/∂ht, the
rst best policy can be written in exactly the same format as in Observation 1. Therefore, if the government is equipped with
 ﬂexible tax on housing wealth, the best it can do is still to fully internalize the externality through this direct instrument,
n which case there is no need to distort the saving behavior or labor–leisure choice of the consumers.
The second best policy presented in Section 3 is modiﬁed. When the utility function is given by Eq. (19) instead of Eq. (1),
eneration t’s conditional demand for housing will also depend on the hours of work, lt, i.e., Eq. (12) extends to
ht = h(Pt(1 + 	t), Pt+1(1 − ı), b0,t, b1,t+1, lt , h¯t). (20)
t is straight forward to derive dht/dlt < 0(> 0) if t,lh = ∂2 (lt, ht)/∂lt∂ht < 0(> 0), which is interpretable to mean that housing is
omplementary with (substitutable for) leisure. The comparative statics with respect to b0,t and b1,t+1 are still given by Eqs.
16a) and (16b), respectively. As such, it is still desirable to subsidize saving at the margin under the condition described in
orollary 1, and the optimal marginal saving subsidy takes the same form as in Proposition 1. However, the optimal marginal
abor income tax rate changes such that the formula in Proposition 1 is now replaced by
wtT
′
0(yt) =
[
˘t
1 + rt+1
˛tMRSth,c0 − 	tPt
](
dht
dlt
− MRStl,c0
dht
db0,t
)
. (21)
ven if ˛tMRSth,c0 > 	tPt , the right hand side of Eq. (21) can be either positive or negative. If leisure and housing are substitutes,
r if they are weak enough complements such that dht/dlt − MRStl,c0dht/db0,t > 0, it is still optimal to tax labor earnings
t the margin, whereas the policy turns into a marginal subsidy if leisure and housing are strong enough complements to
mply dht/dlt − MRStl,c0dht/db0,t < 0.
.2. Bequest motives
In the benchmark model examined in Sections 2 and 3, we  assumed that individuals sell their houses when becoming old
nd then spend all remaining wealth on non-durable consumption. Yet, a durable good may  not only be used to fund future
onsumption of the current owner, it may  also provide a source of wealth for future generations. An alternative formulation
f the model would thus be to assume that old individuals give their homes as a bequest to the next generation. Allowing for
ltruism of this type makes the analysis substantially more complex, and we  therefore only brieﬂy discuss the implications
f bequests in a highly stylized case.21
The important implication of altruism from our perspective is that relative consumption concerns for housing will lead
o intergenerational externalities. This aspect can be captured in a simpliﬁed model where only one arbitrary generation
 leaves the home as a bequest to generation t + 1, while all other generations are assumed to behave in the same way as
n Sections 2 and 3. Such a framework makes it possible to examine the policy implications of altruism without having to
lter the time-separable structure in other parts of the model.22 In this setting, generation t + 1 may  increase its housing
onsumption through an investment in the inherited home. Our model then implies that generation t directly affects the
ositional externality in period t + 1, h¯t+1, via its choice of housing. Also, to avoid the extra complications that would follow
f generation t and the government prefer different intergenerational tradeoffs, we have assumed that the social welfare
unction is given by a discounted sum of generational utilities, and that generation t discounts the utility of generation t + 1
sing the same discount rate as the government.
If generation t treats the decision-variables of generation t + 1 as exogenous, it is straightforward to show that the ﬁrst best
olicy presented in Observation 1 continues to apply. The intuition is that generation t effectively faces the marginal tax on
ousing wealth both in period t and t + 1, and the externality it imposes on generation t + 1 is proportional to the externality
hat each individual of generation t + 1 imposes on other people of the same generation. Therefore, the intergenerational
xternality caused by generation t is internalized through the marginal tax on housing wealth in period t + 1, while the
21 Calculations and proofs for the stylized bequest case are available from the authors upon request.
22 An implication of altruism is that the bequest-giving generation’s ﬁrst order condition for housing becomes dependent on the next generation’s
ecision-variables, which complicates the analysis considerably. To avoid most of these complications, while still being able to address the intergenerational
xternality mentioned above, we assume that all generations other than t sell the house during the second period of life.
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remaining within-generation externality is internalized through the marginal tax on housing wealth in period t. This means,
in turn, that the optimal marginal labor and capital income taxes are equal to zero.
In case the marginal tax on housing wealth is predetermined (the scenario examined in Section 3), the second best optimal
tax policy implemented for generation t generally differs from that of the benchmark model. More speciﬁcally, the marginal
savings and labor income taxes implemented for generation t contain two analogous components: one referring to the
discrepancy between the marginal positional externality and the marginal tax on housing wealth in period t and the other to
the corresponding discrepancy in period t + 1. Only the ﬁrst component was  present in the benchmark model, which is seen
from Proposition 1. The intuition is, of course, that the tax policy is now designed to correct both for within-generation and
between-generation externalities. As a consequence, the results are more difﬁcult to interpret here. However, if the marginal
tax on housing wealth is sufﬁciently small compared to the marginal positional externality in period t + 1, the second best
optimal policy includes a marginal saving subsidy and marginal labor income tax for generation t under the same conditions
as in Corollary 1, in which case the qualitative result from the benchmark model remains valid.
5. Conclusions
This paper deals with the policy implications of relative consumption concerns for durable goods, exempliﬁed by housing,
where each individual’s consumption choice imposes negative positional externalities on other people. Without any other
distortion, a ﬁrst best policy would in this case be to tax housing wealth such that the marginal tax exactly corresponds
to the value of the marginal externality. However, taxes on housing wealth are politically controversial, and the tax rates
observed in many countries are much lower than a rate that would internalize such a positionality externality if calculated
based on empirical evidence. We  therefore consider a second-best solution where marginal taxes (or subsidies) on savings
and labor income are used to supplement the tax on housing wealth. Our analysis shows that as long as the existing marginal
tax on housing wealth falls short of the marginal externality that relative housing consumption gives rise to, a second-best
optimal solution is achieved through a mix  of marginal saving subsidies and marginal labor income taxes.
There are several issues worth further examination. First, although our analysis brieﬂy addresses altruism and intergen-
erational transfer of housing, additional questions remain to be addressed. For instance, if taxes on housing wealth cannot
be used to their full potential (a scenario addressed both in Sections 3 and 4), taxes on inheritance or gifts also constitute
potential second best instruments through which to correct for positional externalities. This is clearly an interesting topic
for future research. Second, if the tax on housing wealth is restricted, a consumption tax or subsidy on the non-positional
good may  serve as a complement to the income tax policy examined above. Such an extension is interesting in its own  right,
and would also allow us to integrate the analysis carried out here with earlier work referred to in the introduction.23 Third,
although our model distinguishes between home ownership and renting (where renting is equivalent to the special case
where the rate of depreciation is equal to one), it does not allow for a choice between these two  possibilities. An obvious
extension would be to consider a model where each individual can either buy or rent a home, and allow such choices to be
associated with different relative concerns. This kind of analysis would (most likely) necessitate a discrete choice model and
is clearly complex enough to motivate its own paper.
Finally, we have assumed away that conspicuous consumption may inﬂuence prices; an issue of potential importance
for understanding the housing market. This simpliﬁcation is of no major concern for the qualitative results derived in the
present paper, since the efﬁciency costs of relative consumption would be driven by the mechanisms laid out above also
in a more general model. Price formation is, nevertheless, important for our understanding of wealth accumulation and
distribution more generally and, therefore, a relevant topic to address in future research. It also opens up for studying the
interesting case where individuals are positional in terms of housing wealth (or possibly both in terms of housing attributes
and wealth). In our model, where the price is ﬁxed, it does not matter for the qualitative results whether individuals are
positional in terms of the attributes (or quantity), h, or in terms of housing wealth, Ph.  In a more general model with an
endogenous housing price, on the other hand, this distinction will most likely matter, and may  possibly strengthen the role
of the marginal saving subsidy and marginal labor income tax examined above, as the reduced demand for housing is likely
to contribute to a lower price as well.
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. By using Eq. (9), Eqs. (18a) and (18b) can be rewritten as follows:( )
∂W
∂Vt
Vt,b0 =
∂W
∂Vt
Vt,b0˛tMRS
t
h,c0
dht
db0,t
+ t 1 − 	tPt dht
db0,t
(A1)
23 We have done some preliminary analysis here. More precisely, we have analyzed whether the introduction of a small tax or subsidy on the non-positional
good  consumed in the ﬁrst period may  lead to higher welfare, given that the marginal saving subsidy and marginal labor income tax are optimally chosen
(as  described in Proposition 1). If the marginal tax on housing wealth falls short of the marginal positional externality, we found that introducing a small tax
on  the non-positional good leads to higher welfare if it decreases the compensated demand for housing. These calculations are available from the authors
upon  request.
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∂W
∂Vt
Vt,b1 =
∂W
∂Vt
Vt,b0˛tMRS
t
h,c0
dht
db1,t+1
− t	tPt dht
db1,t+1
+ t+1. (A2)
qs. (A1), (A2) and (18c) can be used to derive
t+1
[
(1 + rt+1) −
Vt,b0
Vt,b1
]
= ∂W
∂Vt
Vt,b0˛tMRS
t
h,c0
(
Vt,b0
Vt,b1
dht
db1,t+1
− dht
db0,t
)
− t	tPt
(
Vt,b0
Vt,b1
dht
db1,t+1
− dht
db0,t
)
(A3)
hile Eqs. (A1) and (18d) can be combined such that
t
[
wt +
Vt,l
Vt,b0
]
= − Vt,l
Vt,b0
[
∂W
∂Vt
Vt,b0˛tMRS
t
h,c0
− t	tPt
]
dht
db0,t
. (A4)
ubstituting (1 + rt+1) − Vt,b0/Vt,b1 = T ′1(strt+1)rt+1 into Eq. (A3), and wt + Vt,l/Vt,b0 = wtT ′0(yt) into Eq. (A4), while using
RStc0c1 = Ut,c0/Ut,c1 = Vt,b0/Vt,b1 , MRS
t
l,c0
= Ut,l/Ut,c0 = Vt,l/Vt,b0 , and ˘t = (∂W/∂Vt)(Vt,b0/t+1), we obtain the marginal
ncome tax rates in Proposition 1. 
roof of Corollary 1. As can be seen from the two marginal tax formulas in Proposition 1, a sufﬁcient condition
or Corollary 1 to hold is that ˛tMRSth,c0 > 	tPt implies ˘ t ≥ 1 + rt+1. By using t+1(1 + rt+1) = t from Eq. (18c) and ˘t =
∂W/∂Vt)(Vt,b0/t+1) > 0, the ﬁrst order condition for b0,t as given by Eq. (18a) can be rewritten as
˘t
(
1 − ˛tMRSth,c0
dht
db0,t
)
= (1 + rt+1)
(
1 − 	tPt dht
db0,t
)
. (A5)
y using Eq. (10a), we can derive
1 − 	tPt
(
dht
db0,t
)
= dc0,t
db0,t
+ Pt
(
dht
db0,t
)
> 0
ince both goods are normal, meaning that 1 − ˛tMRSth,c0 (dht/db0,t) > 0 from Eq. (A5). Therefore, by reorganizing Eq. (A5)
uch that
˘t
1 + rt+1
= 1 − 	tPt(dht/db0,t)
1 − ˛tMRSth,c0 (dht/db0,t)
(A6)
e can see that ˛tMRSth,c0 > 	tPt implies ˘ t > 1 + rt+1. 
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